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Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design with
Stochastic Supply and Flexible Consumers
Shiva Navabi, Student Member, IEEE, Ashutosh Nayyar, Member, IEEE
Abstract—We consider the problem of designing an expected-
revenue maximizing mechanism for allocating multiple non-
perishable goods of k varieties to flexible consumers over T time
steps. In our model, a random number of goods of each variety
may become available to the seller at each time and a random
number of consumers may enter the market at each time. Each
consumer is present in the market for one time step and wants to
consume one good of one of its desired varieties. Each consumer is
associated with a flexibility level that indicates the varieties of the
goods it is equally interested in. A consumer’s flexibility level and
the utility it gets from consuming a good of its desired varieties
are its private information. We characterize the allocation rule
for a Bayesian incentive compatible, individually rational and
expected revenue maximizing mechanism in terms of the solution
to a dynamic program. The corresponding payment function
is also specified in terms of the optimal allocation function.
We leverage the structure of the consumers’ flexibility model
to simplify the dynamic program and provide an alternative
description of the optimal mechanism in terms of thresholds
computed by the dynamic program.
Index Terms—Revenue maximization, Dynamic mechanism de-
sign, Bayesian incentive compatibility, Flexible demand, Optimal
mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the scenario faced by a monopolist seller with
multiple resources who wants to allocate them to consumers
over time in order to maximize its expected total revenue.
The seller offers goods of different varieties and there may
be new additions to its stock of each variety over time.
Different consumers may interact with the market at various
points in time, each for a limited duration. Such a scenario
arises in many marketplaces where the available supply and
the population of the consumers vary in an uncertain fashion
over time. In cloud computing platforms [1], for example, the
computational and data storage resources get freed up with
the termination of previously submitted jobs dynamically over
time and are dedicated to processing of the new tasks as they
are received by the platform. In power distribution networks
with partial reliance on the renewable energy resources [2] the
energy supply varies over time depending on the availability
of the intermittent source of energy; the amount of power
demanded by the consumer base connected to the grid is
also uncertain and constantly fluctuates over time. In wireless
spectrum management platforms [3] the available spectrum
bands are leased to secondary wireless service providers for
temporary usage and are freed up as the interim lease contracts
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terminate dynamically over time. One particular feature that
makes these resource allocation problems challenging is that in
the face of uncertainty about the future supply and demand the
seller needs to decide whether to use its limited resources to
serve a currently present consumer or keep them for potentially
more profitable transactions in future. Moreover, in order to
decide about the optimal way of allocating its resources, the
seller needs the information about the consumers’ preferences
and restrictions, and their willingness to pay for their desired
goods or services. Typically, however, this information is
known privately to each consumer and the seller needs to elicit
this data from them. Since the consumers are self-interested
and strategic, they may distort their privately held information
when communicating it to the seller if they believe that they
can benefit from such misrepresentations. The seller thus needs
to provide incentives to the consumers in a way that they
would find it in their own best interest to disclose their private
information truthfully to the seller. The theory of mechanism
design provides a systematic framework for designing the rules
of interaction between multiple strategic agents in a way that
the principal decision maker’s desired outcome emerges at the
equilibrium of the induced game.
Auctions as a special class of mechanisms have been
extensively studied in the context of mechanism design. Due
to their practical advantages over conventional selling schemes
such as menu-based pricing, auctions are being adopted in
an increasing number of marketplaces for pricing and selling
various products and services. While the theory of auction
design is well developed under static settings, its extension to
dynamic markets that involve allocation and pricing of time-
varying supply to accommodate time-varying demand under
incomplete information is generally less mature and is still an
active area of research [4]. Given the growing practical interest
in exploring the potential of auction mechanisms for allocating
and pricing resources in dynamically operating markets, a
deeper understanding of the design and implementation of
such auctions is crucial.
In this paper we study the problem of designing expected-
revenue maximizing auctions for selling indivisible and
durable goods of k varieties to consumers over a discrete, finite
time horizon. Additional units of each variety may become
available to the seller at each time step. In our setup, each
consumer is associated with a flexibility level which indicates
the varieties of the goods that the consumer finds equally
desirable. Formally, the flexibility level of a consumer is a
number in the range 1, . . . , k such that a consumer with
flexibility level j wants to get a good of any of the first j
varieties. Each consumer is present in the market for one time
2period and wants to receive one good (of any of the desired
varieties) prior to its departure. The flexibility level and the
valuation a consumer has for a desirable good are both its
private information.
There are several markets with a temporally fluctuating
consumer base where the flexibility in demand described
above arises. We describe two such scenarios below.
1. Dynamic Spectrum Management in Cognitive Radio
Networks: With the emergence of various wireless applications
for mobile users, there has been significant increase in the
demand for radio frequency spectrum in recent years.
While most of the available radio spectrum has already
been licensed off to the existing wireless service providers
(WSPs), they are not being fully utilized by their primary
owners. As pointed out in [3], dynamic spectrum access
protocols can enable efficient use of these underutilized
frequency bands – referred to as spectrum holes in [3] –
by accommodating the demands of secondary users who
can use these bands on a temporary basis. Cognitive radio
systems can detect the presence of such spectrum holes in
the frequency bands owned by a primary user. Consider the
problem faced by one such spectrum owner who wants to
allocate its underutilized frequency bands of various widths,
as they become available over time, to secondary WSPs who
have different minimum bandwidth requirements. Suppose
the primary owner has frequency bands of widths w1, . . . , wk
such that w1 > w2 > · · · > wk. We say that a WSP is of
flexibility level j if it requires a frequency band of width
at least wj . At the beginning of each time step t a random
number of WSPs arrive into the market to compete for the
limited radio frequency bands available at that time. The
resource allocation problem that a primary spectrum owner
encounters when it aims to allocate its intermittently available
frequency bands to secondary users’ temporary usage can be
modeled within the framework developed in the present paper.
2. Allocation of Computational Resources in Cloud Com-
puting Platforms: Consider Amazon’s EC2 cloud computing
platform that sells various types of computational resources
such as memory, CPU, storage cpacity, computer applications,
etc. In this market, clients can randomly enter and depart
over time. Clients rent virtual machines or instances and are
typically charged on an hourly basis per instance depending on
the duration of their usage as well as the rented instance type.
Each of the instance types are offered in different sizes to suit
various purposes. As explained in [1], for example, Amazon’s
EC2 offers “standard” instances in three sizes: small, large and
extra-large. A consumer can belong to one of three flexibility
classes:
• Inflexible consumers who need an extra-large instance.
• Somewhat flexible consumers who need a large or extra-
large instance.
• Flexible consumers who are fine with receiving any of
the three types of instances.
The allocation of computing instances to consumers of differ-
ing flexibilities can be modeled by our setup.
A. Prior Work
Much of the prior work in the area of dynamic auctions can
be grouped in two categories [5]: 1) markets with a dynamic
population of consumers whose private information remain
unchanged over time, and 2) markets with a fixed population
of consumers whose private information evolve over time.
Within each of these two categories the important findings
on efficiency (social-welfare maximization) and optimality
(revenue maximization) as the two primary objectives are high-
lighted in [5]. Our work falls under the first category (dynamic
population) above with the focus on revenue maximization as
the main objective. Therefore, we will focus on comparing
our model with prior works that have addressed revenue
maximization under the first category above. We can broadly
categorize the works in this strand of the literature based
on certain features of the seller’s supply and the consumers’
demands as follows:
1) Dynamic Auctions with Multiple Identical and Durable
Goods: The works in this area have studied dynamic revenue-
maximizing auctions in settings where the seller has multiple
identical goods and wants to sell them to unit-demand1 con-
sumers over a finite or infinite time horizon. Vulcano et al
[7] consider a setup where the seller has an initial capacity
of C units of the same good and wants to sell them to unit-
demand consumers over T time steps where each consumer
is present in the market for one time period. Pai and Vohra
[8] consider the same setup under the assumption that each
consumer can have a presence time window longer than one
time period where each consumer’s entry and exit times are
its private information. Lavi and Nisan [9] consider a setup
similar to the one in [8] where each consumer may demand
more than one unit of the good. Gallien [10] studies a similar
setup where the seller offersK identical items for sale over an
infinite time horizon and consumers are assumed to be unit-
demand and time sensitive in the sense that they discount their
future utility with a common time-discount factor. Gershkov et
al [11] design a revenue-maximizing mechanism for a setting
where the seller has multiple identical goods for sale over an
infinite continuous time horizon. They assume in [11] that the
consumers are unit-demand and that each consumer’s arrival
time as well as its valuation are its private information.
The key feature that differentiates these setups from our
model is that in all of them the goods are assumed to be
identical. In our model, each consumer, depending on its
flexibility level, subjectively differentiates between the goods.
In particular, a consumer with flexibility level j has the same
positive valuation for any good of varieties 1, . . . , j and zero
valuation for a good of varieties j + 1, . . . , k. Furthermore,
in our model, more units may be added to the seller’s supply
of different varieties over time. In the setups described above,
the seller’s supply is limited to the initial stock of the goods
available at the beginning of the time horizon.
2) Dynamic Auctions with Multiple Identical and Perish-
able Goods: Said [12] considers a setup where a seller obtains
an uncertain number of perishable2 identical goods at each
1A unit-demand consumer wants to receive one unit of the good [6].
2A good is perishable if it cannot be stored for future allocations.
3time step and wants to sell them to unit-demand consumers
over an infinite discrete time horizon. Each consumer may
depart the market exogenously at any time period t after its
arrival with a common probability (1−γt) ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise,
a consumer continues to interact with the market until it gets an
allocation. Unlike the setup in [12], in our model we assume
that goods are durable and could thus be stored for future
allocations. Moreover, in contrast to [12], we assume that
consumers are present in the market for one time step only.
Lastly, in our model goods are valued differently by different
consumers depending on their flexibility levels whereas in
[12] the offered goods are all identical from the consumers’
viewpoints.
3) Dynamic Auctions with Multiple Heterogeneous Goods:
The papers in this line of work study dynamic revenue-
maximizing auction design problem in cases where the seller
has multiple heterogeneous goods and wants to sell them
to unit-demand consumers over a finite/infinite time horizon.
Gershkov and Moldovanu in [13] study one such setup over
a continuous and finite time horizon where the goods are
commonly ranked by the consumers that are impatient, i.e.,
they want to get an allocation immediately upon arrival in the
market. Unlike this setup, each consumer in our model has
subjective preferences for different varieties of the goods and
each consumer’s desired varieties are its private information.
Furthermore, in our model, additional goods of each variety
may be added to the seller’s supply over time which is not the
case in [13].
4) Dynamic Auctions with Private Departure Times:
Mierendorff [14] considers a setup where a seller wants to
sell a single indivisible good over T time steps to consumers
who are privately informed about their valuations as well as
their deadlines for buying the single item in the dynamic
auction. The key differences between this work and our setup
are: 1) in our model the seller offers multiple goods that are
differentiated by each consumer subjectively based on their
privately known flexibility levels while in [14] the seller has
only one good for sale, 2) the consumers’ exit times are known
to the seller in our setup while they are privately known to
each consumer in [14] and, 3) in our model each consumer is
present in the market for one time step only while in [14] a
consumer may remain present in the market for multiple time
periods.
In the model studied by Pai and Vohra in [8] each con-
sumer’s departure time is assumed to be its private informa-
tion. As mentioned in Section I-A1 however, unlike our model,
in the setup in [8] goods are assumed to be identical.
B. Notations
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters
(X,Y,N) or by Greek letters (θ), their realizations by the
corresponding lower case letters (x, y, n), or by Greek letters
with tilde (θ˜). {0, 1}N×M denotes the space of N × M
matrices with entries that are either 0 or 1. 01×k is the k-
dimensional all-zeros row vector. Z≥0 and Z+ denote the
sets of non-negative and positive integers, respectively. For
a set A, |A| denotes the cardinality of A. x+ is the positive
part of the real number x, that is, x+ = max(x, 0). 1{a≤b}
denotes 1 if the inequality in the subscript is true and 0
otherwise. E denotes the expectation operator. For a random
variable/random vector θ, Eθ denotes that the expectation is
with respect to the probability distribution of θ.3 x1:n, y
1:m
and z1:m1:n are shorthands for vectors (x1, . . . , xn), (y
1, . . . , ym)
and (z11 , . . . , z
m
1 , . . . , z
1
n, . . . , z
m
n ), respectively. For the vector
y1:m, y−j is the shorthand for (y1, . . . , yj−1, yj+1, . . . , ym).
The summation
n∑
i=m
yi equals zero when n < m regardless of
the indexed quantities yi.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a setup where a seller offers k varieties of
goods for sale over T time steps. At each time step a
random number of consumers enter the market. Let the random
variable Nt denote the number of consumers that arrive at
time step t. Nt is an integer-valued random variable that takes
values in the set {0, 1, . . . , n¯} according to the probability
mass function (PMF) λt(·). At each time step a random
number of goods of varieties 1, 2, . . . , k become available to
the seller. Let the random variable X
j
t denote the number of
goods of variety j that become available at time step t. X
j
t
is an integer-valued random variable that takes values in the
set {0, 1, . . . , x¯j} according to the PMF γjt (·). The random
variablesN1:T , X
1:k
1:T , are mutually independent. Let Y
j
t denote
the number of unallocated goods of variety j at time t — this
includes X
j
t as well as any unallocated variety j goods from
the past. Let V
j
t denote the number of variety j goods allocated
by the seller at time t. Y
j
t evolves according to the following
dynamics:
Y
j
t+1 =
t+1∑
s=1
Xjs −
t∑
s=1
V js = Y
j
t − V
j
t +X
j
t+1, t ≥ 1,
Y
j
1 = X
j
1 , j = 1, 2, . . . , k. (1)
A. Consumer Flexibility and Consumer Type
Each consumer can consume at most one good. Each
consumer has a flexibility level that indicates the varieties
of goods the consumer is equally interested in. A consumer
with flexibility level 1 wants to get one good of variety 1,
a consumer with flexibility level 2 wants to get one good of
either variety 1 or variety 2, and in general, a consumer with
flexibility level j wants to get one good of any of the first j
varieties.
Each consumer is associated with a 4-tuple (θ, b, tA, tD)
where:
1) θ is the consumer’s utility if it receives one good of a
desired variety. We refer to θ as the consumer’s valuation.
2) b is the consumer’s flexibility level.
3) tA is the consumer’s arrival time.
4) tD is the consumer’s departure time.
A consumer can receive a good at any time t, tA ≤ t ≤ tD.
3The subscript for E[·] operator is added only when its absence is likely to
cause ambiguity.
4Definition 1. We say that a consumer is impatient [6, Chapter
16] if its arrival and departure times are the same. Thus, an
impatient consumer can only receive a good at its arrival time.
In this paper we assume that all consumers are impatient.
The random variable bit denotes the flexibility level of
the ith consumer arriving at time t. bit takes values in the
set {1, . . . , k} according to the PMF gt(·). The random
variable θit denotes the valuation of the ith consumer ar-
riving at time t. Given bit = j, θ
i
t takes values in Θ :=
[θmin, θmax] with conditional probability density pit(·|b
i
t =
j). We define the joint distribution function ft(θ˜, j) :=
pit(θ˜|j).gt(j) , j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, θ˜ ∈ Θ. The probability
distributions λt(·), ft(·), γ
j
t (·), ∀t, ∀j are common knowledge.
For a consumer with valuation θ˜ and flexibility level b˜ we
refer to the pair (θ˜, b˜) as its type. Each consumer’s type is
independent of the other consumers’ types and of the random
variables N1:T , X
1:k
1:T .
B. Direct Mechanisms
We consider a direct mechanism where each consumer
arriving in the market reports a valuation from the set Θ and
a flexibility level from the set {1, 2, . . . , k}. Each consumer
can misreport its valuation and flexibility level. Consider a
consumer whose true type is (θ˜, b˜) and let (r, c) denote the
type it reports, where r is the reported valuation and c is the
reported flexibility level. The consumers’ arrivals are publicly
observed. Hence, Nt is observed by the seller at time t and by
the consumers who arrive at time t. We make the following
assumptions about the consumers’ reported types:
Assumption 1. We assume that:
1) Each consumer reports its valuation and flexibility level
simultaneously at its arrival time.
2) No consumer departs the market without reporting a type
to the seller.
3) Consumers cannot over-report their flexibility levels, that
is, c cannot exceed b˜.
C. Feasible Allocations
Suppose nt consumers arrive at time t, i.e., Nt = nt. Let
hRt := {(r
1
t , c
1
t ), . . . , (r
nt
t , c
nt
t )} be the collection of reports
made by the consumers arriving at time t, where (rit, c
i
t)
denotes the type reported by the ith consumer arriving at time
t. If nt = 0, then h
R
t = ∅. LetH
R
t denote the set of all possible
values of hRt . At each time t if h
R
t 6= ∅, an allocation of the
available goods among the currently present consumers can be
described by a binary matrix At ∈ {0, 1}nt×k. At(i, j) = 1
if the ith consumer is allocated a good of the jth variety at
time t and At(i, j) = 0 otherwise. The matrix At is called an
allocation matrix at time t. At must satisfy some feasibility
constraints. In particular,
nt∑
i=1
At(i, j) ≤ y
j
t , ∀j, where y
j
t is
the number of variety j goods available for allocation at time
t. Further, we require that each consumer is allocated at most
one good of its desired varieties and no goods of its unde-
sired varieties, i.e.,
∑
j≤ci
t
At(i, j) ≤ 1,
∑
j>ci
t
At(i, j) = 0 for
i = 1, . . . , nt. A binary matrix that satisfies these constraints
is called a feasible allocation matrix at time t. For hRt 6= ∅,
let S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) ⊂ {0, 1}
nt×k denote the set of all feasible
allocation matrices at time t.
D. Mechanism Setup
Let ht denote all the information that the seller knows at
time t. We call ht the history at time t which is given as:
ht :=
{
hR1:t , y
1:k
1:t , x
1:k
1:t
}
. (2)
Let Ht denote the set of all possible values of ht. We use Ht
to denote a random history.
A mechanism needs to specify allocations and payments
at each time t for which the number of arriving consumers
is nonzero, i.e., hRt 6= ∅. Such a mechanism consists of the
following components:
• A sequence of allocation functions q1:T such that for any
ht with h
R
t 6= ∅, qt(ht) ∈ S(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ). qt(ht) describes
the allocation matrix to be used at time t.
• A sequence of payment functions p1:T such that for any
ht with h
R
t 6= ∅, pt(ht) ∈ R
|hRt |. The ith component
pit(ht) of pt(ht) describes the payment charged to the
ith consumer at time t.
E. Consumer Utility Model
Suppose ht is the history at time t and (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t) is the true
type of the ith consumer arriving at time t. Then, under the
mechanism (q1:T , p1:T ), this consumer’s utility is given as
u(θ˜it, b˜
i
t, ht) = θ˜
i
t
(∑
j≤b˜i
t
q
i,j
t (ht)
)
− pit(ht), (3)
where q
i,j
t (ht) is the entry in the ith row and jth column of
the allocation matrix qt(ht) and p
i
t(ht) is the ith entry of the
payments vector pt(ht).
F. Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
The seller needs to design a mechanism that satisfies in-
centive compatibility and individual rationality constraints as
described below.
In a Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism, truth-
ful reporting of private information (valuations and flexibil-
ity levels in our setup) constitutes an equilibrium of the
Bayesian game induced by the mechanism. In other words,
each consumer would prefer to report its true type provided
that all other consumers have adopted truth-telling strategy.
Moreover, according to the revelation principle [15], restriction
to incentive compatible direct mechanisms is without loss of
generality.
Suppose nt consumers arrive at time t and let (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t) be the
true type of the ith consumer arriving at time t. Recall that
Nt is observed by the consumers who arrive at time t (see
Section II-B). Assuming that all other consumers report their
5types truthfully, consumer i’s expected utility if it reports its
type truthfully will be
EH−i
t
[
θ˜it
∑
j≤b˜it
q
i,j
t (H
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t))−p
i
t(H
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)) | Nt = nt
]
,
(4)
where the expectation is with respect to the collection of
random variables H−it which includes all variables in the
history at time t except the ith consumer’s report.
Now suppose the consumer with type (θ˜it, b˜
i
t) reports (r
i
t, c
i
t)
as its type rather than (θ˜it, b˜
i
t). That is, the consumer might
misreport its valuation or its flexibility level or both. Assuming
that all other consumers truthfully report their types, this
consumer’s expected utility if it reports (rit, c
i
t) will be
EH−i
t
[
θ˜it
∑
j≤b˜it
q
i,j
t (H
−i
t , (r
i
t, c
i
t))−p
i
t(H
−i
t , (r
i
t, c
i
t)) | Nt = nt
]
.
(5)
BIC constraint is satisfied if each consumer’s expected utility
is maximized when it reports its valuation and flexibility level
truthfully, provided that all other consumers report their types
truthfully. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the ith consumer
at time t BIC constraint can be expressed as follows:
EH−i
t
[
θ˜it
∑
j≤b˜it
q
i,j
t (H
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t))− p
i
t(H
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)) | Nt = nt
]
≥ EH−i
t
[
θ˜it
∑
j≤b˜i
t
q
i,j
t (H
−i
t , (r
i
t, c
i
t))− p
i
t(H
−i
t , (r
i
t, c
i
t)) | Nt = nt
]
,
∀θ˜it, r
i
t ∈ Θ , c
i
t ≤ b˜
i
t, c
i
t, b˜
i
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} , ∀nt, ∀t.
(6)
Individual Rationality (IR) constraint ensures that the con-
sumer’s expected utility at the truthful reporting equilibrium is
non-negative. Using (4), from the viewpoint of ith consumer
at time t IR constraint can be described as follows:
EH−it
[
θ˜it
∑
j≤b˜i
t
q
i,j
t (H
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t))
− pit(H
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)) | Nt = nt
]
≥ 0 , ∀nt, ∀t.
(7)
G. Expected Revenue Maximization
Consider a BIC and IR mechanism (q1:T , p1:T ). When all
consumers adopt the truthful strategy, the history at time t is
Ht :=
{
{(θi1, b
i
1)}
N1
i=1, . . . , {(θ
i
t, b
i
t)}
Nt
i=1, Y
1:k
1:t , X
1:k
1:t
}
, (8)
and the expected total revenue is E
{ T∑
t=1
Nt∑
i=1
pit(Ht)
}
.
The mechanism design problem can now be formulated as
max
(q1:T ,p1:T )
E
{ T∑
t=1
Nt∑
i=1
pit(Ht)
}
, subject to (6) , (7). (9)
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF BIC AND IR MECHANISMS
In this section we provide a characterization of BIC and IR
mechanisms that will be useful for solving the problem in (9).
A. Interim Allocation and Payment
Suppose nt consumers arrive at time t and let (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
be the true type of the ith consumer arriving at time t.
Assuming that all other consumers report their types truthfully,
this consumer’s expected allocation and payment under the
mechanism (q1:T , p1:T ) if it reports the pair (r
i
t, c
i
t) are given
as
Qit(r
i
t, c
i
t, nt) := EH−i
t
[∑
j≤ci
t
q
i,j
t (H
−i
t , (r
i
t, c
i
t)) | Nt = nt
]
(10)
P it (r
i
t, c
i
t, nt) := EH−i
t
[
pit(H
−i
t , (r
i
t, c
i
t)) | Nt = nt
]
(11)
In the following lemmas, we provide an operational character-
ization of the BIC and IR mechanisms in terms of the interim
quantities defined in (10)-(11).
Lemma 1. A mechanism (q1:T , p1:T ) satisfies the BIC and IR
constraints if given Nt = nt, the following conditions hold
true for all i ∈ {1, . . . , nt}, ∀t,
(i) Qit(r, c, nt) is non-decreasing in r for all c ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
(ii) Qit(r, c, nt) is non-decreasing in c for all r ∈ Θ.
(iii) P it (θ
min, c, nt) = 0 , for all c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
(iv) The interim payment in (11) takes the following form for
all r ∈ Θ, c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}:
P it (r, c, nt) = r Q
i
t(r, c, nt)−
r∫
θmin
Qit(s, c, nt) ds (12)
− θmin Qit(θ
min, c, nt).
(v) θmin Qit(θ
min, c, nt) ≥ 0 , ∀c.
Proof. The proof closely follows the standard arguments in
[16, Section III].
Lemma 2. Any BIC and IR mechanism (q1:T , p1:T ) satisfies
P it (r, c, nt) ≤ r Q
i
t(r, c, nt)−
r∫
θmin
Qit(s, c, nt) ds, (13)
for all t, nt, i ∈ {1, . . . , nt}, r ∈ Θ, c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Proof. The proof closely follows the standard arguments in
[16, Section III].
IV. REVENUE MAXIMIZING MECHANISM
In this section we characterize the expected-revenue maxi-
mizing mechanism. Let us define
wt(θ˜, b˜) :=
(
θ˜ −
1−Πt(θ˜ | b˜)
pit(θ˜ | b˜)
)
, (14)
where Πt(· | b˜) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
corresponding to the conditional probability density function
(pdf) pit(· | b˜). In economics terminology, wt(θ˜, b˜) is referred
to as the virtual valuation [15, Chapter 3] of a consumer with
type (θ˜, b˜) that arrives at time t.
We make the following assumptions to simplify the solution
to the optimal mechanism design problem in (9).
Assumption 2. We assume that
6(i) The conditional probability density functions
pit(·|c), t = 1, . . . , T, c = 1, . . . , k satisfy the generalized
monotone hazard rate condition [8, Section 2], [16,
Section IV]. That is, for all t, we assume
pit(x|c)
1−Πt(x|c)
is
non-decreasing in x and c. Moreover, we assume that for
all t if x ≥ x′ and c > c′, then pit(x|c)1−Πt(x|c) >
pit(x
′|c′)
1−Πt(x′|c′)
.
(ii) wt(θ
min, j) < 0 for all j, t.
In the following lemma we provide a characterization of the
expected-revenue maximizing mechanism.
Lemma 3. Suppose (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ) is a BIC and IR mechanism
for which the following conditions are true:
(i) (q∗1:T ) is the solution to the following functional opti-
mization problem
max
q1:T
E
[ T∑
t=1
Nt∑
i=1
wt(θ
i
t, b
i
t)
(∑
j≤bit
q
i,j
t (Ht)
) ]
, (15)
where Ht is the history under truthful reporting.
(ii) Given the history ht and assuming that nt consumers
arrive at time t, the payment charged to the ith consumer
arriving at time t with the true type (θ˜it, b˜
i
t) is given as:
p∗it (h
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)) = θ˜
i
t
∑
j≤b˜i
t
q
∗i,j
t (h
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t))
−
θ˜it∫
θmin
(∑
j≤b˜it
q
∗i,j
t (h
−i
t , (α, b˜
i
t))
)
dα, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , nt}, ∀nt, ∀t,
(16)
where, h−it = ht \ {(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)}.
Then (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ) gives the highest expected revenue in the
class of BIC and IR mechanisms.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The results of Lemma 3 imply that in order for a BIC and IR
mechanism to maximize the expected revenue, its allocation
rules must solve the functional optimization problem in (15).
This problem can be viewed as a stochastic control problem.
In the following section, we describe this stochastic control
problem and formulate a dynamic program to find the optimal
allocation rules.
V. SOLUTION TO THE STOCHASTIC CONTROL PROBLEM
The optimization problem in (15) is a finite horizon stochas-
tic control problem with the history at time t (with truthful
reporting) as the state and the allocation matrix as the action
at time t. The allocation functions q1:T are the control strategy
and the optimization in (15) is to find the control strategy
with the highest expected reward. This stochastic control
perspective provides a dynamic program for the optimization
in (15). We then leverage the structure of the consumers’
flexibility model to simplify the dynamic program.
A. Dynamic Program
For a truthful history ht at time t, let Rt(ht) denote the
maximum expected reward from t to T for the stochastic
control problem in (15). Rt(ht) is a value function and obeys
the standard dynamic programming recursions given below:
If hRt = ∅ : Rt(ht) := E
[
Rt+1(Ht+1) | ht
]
(17)
If hRt 6= ∅ :
Rt(ht) := max
A∈S(hRt ,y
1:k
t )
{ |hRt |∑
i=1
wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
k∑
j=1
A(i, j)
(18)
+ E
[
Rt+1(Ht+1) | ht,At = A
]}
,
where RT+1(·) = 0.
In the above dynamic program, the information state at time
t is ht (since the value functions have ht as the argument). It
can be shown that the only relevant part of the history are the
reports and the state of supply at current time. In the following
lemma, we use this idea to simplify the information state and
the dynamic program.
Lemma 4. Let st = (h
R
t , y
1:k
t ). There exist functions
V1(·), . . . , VT (·) such that at each time t:
Vt(st) = Rt(st, x
1:k
t , ht−1) ,
for all {st, x
1:k
t , ht−1} ∈ Ht. (19)
Further, these functions obey the following dynamic program:
If hRt = ∅ : Vt(st) = E
[
Vt+1(St+1) | st
]
(20)
If hRt 6= ∅ :
Vt(st) = max
A∈S(hR
t
,y1:k
t
)
{ |hRt |∑
i=1
wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
k∑
j=1
A(i, j)
(21)
+ E
[
Vt+1(St+1) | st,At = A
]}
,
where VT+1(·) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on the results of Lemma 4, the optimal allocation
functions can be described in terms of the solution to the
dynamic program in (20)-(21) with the simplified information
state st = (h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) at time t.
In the dynamic program in (21) at each time t, the opti-
mization variables comprise all the entries of the |hRt | × k
allocation matrix At. In sequel we simplify the dynamic
program formulation in terms of alternate variables that need
to be optimized at each time.
B. Alternative Optimization Variables
Consider the information state (hRt , y
1:k
t ) with h
R
t 6= ∅ and
an allocation matrix A ∈ S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) at time t. Let u
j
t denote
the number of consumers with flexibility level j that get a
7good at time t under A. That is, u
j
t :=
|hRt |∑
i=1
i:b˜it=j
∑
l≤j
A(i, l),
where A(i, l) is the entry in the ith row and lth column of
the matrix A. Let U(hRt , y
1:k
t ) denote the set of admissible
values of u1:kt given the information state (h
R
t , y
1:k
t ). Thus
for every vector u1:k ∈ U(hRt , y
1:k
t ), there exists a matrix
Aˆ ∈ S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) such that
|hRt |∑
i=1
i:b˜it=j
∑
l≤j
Aˆ(i, l) = uj , ∀j. If
hRt = ∅, no consumer is present to be allocated and thus we
define U(hRt , y
1:k
t ) := {01×k}. In the following lemma, we
provide a more operational characterization of U(hRt , y
1:k
t ).
Lemma 5. Given the information state (hRt , y
1:k
t ) at time t,
U(hRt , y
1:k
t ) =
{
u1:k ∈ Zk≥0 :
j∑
l=1
ul ≤
j∑
l=1
ylt , u
j ≤ njt , ∀j
}
,
(22)
where n
j
t denotes the number of consumers with flexibility level
j that arrive at time t.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Consider the information state (hRt , y
1:k
t ) with h
R
t 6= ∅ and
an allocation matrix A ∈ S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) at time t. Let v
j
t denote
the number of goods of variety j allocated at time t under A,
i.e., v
j
t :=
|hRt |∑
i=1
A(i, j). Given some vector u1:kt ∈ U(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ),
let V(u1:kt , y
1:k
t ) denote the set of all values of v
1:k
t that can
fulfill the demand represented by u1:kt under the supply y
1:k
t .
More precisely, for every vector v1:k ∈ V(u1:kt , y
1:k
t ), there
exists a matrix Aˆ ∈ S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) such that for each j, Aˆ serves
u
j
t consumers of flexibility level j (i.e.,
|hRt |∑
i=1
i:b˜it=j
∑
l≤j
Aˆ(i, l) = ujt )
and allocates vj goods of variety j (i.e.,
|hRt |∑
i=1
Aˆ(i, j) = vj).
If hRt = ∅, no consumer is present to be allocated and thus
V(u1:kt , y
1:k
t ) = V(01×k, y
1:k
t ) = {01×k}. In the following
lemma, we provide a more operational characterization of
V(u1:kt , y
1:k
t ).
Lemma 6. Given the information state (hRt , y
1:k
t ) and the
vector u1:kt ∈ U(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) at time t,
V(u1:kt , y
1:k
t ) =
{
v1:k ∈ Zk≥0 : (23)
vj ≤ yjt , j = 1, . . . , k,
j∑
l=1
ult ≤
j∑
l=1
vl , j = 1, . . . , k − 1 ,
k∑
l=1
ult =
k∑
l=1
vl
}
.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5 and is
therefore omitted.
In the following lemma we show that the two k-dimensional
vectors u1:kt and v
1:k
t constructed above, can be treated as the
optimization variables in the dynamic program in (21).
Lemma 7. The value function in (21) can be equivalently
expressed below:
Vt(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) = max
u1:k∈U(hR
t
,y1:k
t
)
{ k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t
+ max
v1:k∈V(u1:k,y1:k
t
)
E
[
Vt+1
(
HRt+1, {y
j
t − v
j +Xjt+1}
k
j=1
)]}
,
(24)
where VT+1(·) = 0. In (24) w
i,j
t denotes the ith largest
element in Wjt defined below:
Wjt := { wt(θ˜, b˜) : (θ˜, b˜) ∈ h
R
t , b˜ = j }, (25)
that is, Wjt denotes the set of virtual valuations (see (14)) of
all the consumers with flexibility level j at time t.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In the following lemma, we establish a monotonicity prop-
erty of the value functions in (24). In Lemma 9 we leverage
this property to construct an optimal solution to the inner
maximization over v1:k vector in (24).
Lemma 8. Consider two supply profiles y1:kt and z
1:k
t such
that:
yit = z
i
t + 1
y
j
t = z
j
t − 1
ylt = z
l
t , for all l 6= i, j ,
(26)
where i < j. Then, the value functions Vt(·) defined in Lemma
4 satisfy the following property:
Vt(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) ≥ Vt(h
R
t , z
1:k
t ) , for all h
R
t and t. (27)
Proof. See Appendix E.
A more intuitive interpretation of the property established
in Lemma 8 is that a good of variety j contributes more to
the generation of revenue in comparison with a good of any
of the varieties j +1, j +2, . . . , k. Consequently, allocating a
good of variety j is at least as costly as allocating a good of
any of the varieties j + 1, j + 2, . . . , k.
Remark 1. The value functions Vt(·) defined in Lemma 4
satisfy a more general version of the monotonicity property
shown in Lemma 8. Consider any two supply profiles y1:kt and
z1:kt such that:
∑j
l=1 y
l
t ≥
∑j
l=1 z
l
t, j = 1, . . . , k. Then, it can
be shown that value functions Vt(·) still satisfy (27).
The property in (27) can be leveraged to provide an explicit
solution for the inner maximization over v1:k in (24). This is
shown in Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. At each time t, given hRt , y
1:k
t and u
1:k ∈
U(hRt , y
1:k
t ), recursively define
v∗k := min(uk, ykt ) (28)
v∗j := min
(
y
j
t , u
j + (
k∑
l=j+1
ul −
k∑
l=j+1
v∗l)
)
, j = k − 1, . . . , 1.
8Then,
v∗1:k ∈ argmax
v1:k∈V(u1:k,y1:k
t
)
E
[
Vt+1
(
HRt+1, {y
j
t − v
j +Xjt+1}
k
j=1
)]
.
(29)
Proof. See Appendix F.
Based on the results of Lemma 9, the value functions in
(24) can be simplified as expressed below:
Vt(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) = max
u1:k∈U(hR
t
,y1:k
t
)
{ k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t
+ E
[
Vt+1
(
HRt+1, {y
j
t − v
∗j +Xjt+1}
k
j=1
)]}
,
(30)
where v∗1:k is obtained corresponding to each u1:k ∈
U(hRt , y
1:k
t ) as described in (28).
VI. THE OPTIMAL MECHANISM
In Lemma 3, we established that the expected-revenue
maximizing allocation rules of a BIC and IR mechanism
indeed coincide with the optimal control strategy for the
stochastic control problem in (15). Based on this insight,
Section V was devoted to development of a characterization
of the optimal control strategy for the problem in (15) in
terms of the solution to a dynamic program (see (17)-(18)).
We leveraged the structure of the flexibility model to simplify
the formulated dynamic program (see lemmas 7-9). In the
following theorem, we use the results of lemmas 3-9 as well
as the characterization of BIC and IR mechanisms provided in
Lemma 1 to specify the allocation and payment rules of the
optimal mechanism.
Theorem 1. Consider the information state
(h−i,Rt , (r, j), y
1:k
t ), where consumer i reports (r, j) as
its type and h
−i,R
t denotes the set of reports from all
consumers other than i. Let u∗1:kt and v
∗1:k
t denote the
optimal vectors that result from solving the dynamic program
in (30). Consider the mechanism (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ) described
below:
• Allocations: Let q∗t (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t ) ∈
S(h−i,Rt , (r, j), y
1:k
t ) denote the allocation matrix
constructed according to the allocation procedure
described below:
(i) Index the goods under the profile v∗1:kt in a non-
decreasing flexibility order, i.e., the v∗1t goods of vari-
ety 1 are indexed as 1, . . . , v∗1t and, the v
∗2
t goods of
variety 2 are indexed as v∗1t + 1, . . . , v
∗1
t + v
∗2
t , and
so on.
(ii) Sort consumers of flexibility level 1 in non-increasing
order of virtual valuations. Top u∗1t consumers of
flexibility level 1 get the first u∗1t goods as arranged
in (i). Ties are resolved randomly.
(iii) Sort consumers of flexibility level 2 in non-
increasing order of virtual valuations. Top u∗2t con-
sumers of flexibility level 2 get the next u∗2t goods.
Ties are resolved randomly.
(iv) Allocations to the top u
∗j
t consumers with flexibility
levels j = 3, . . . , k are carried out in the same fashion
as above.
(v) The rest of the consumers do not get an allocation.
• Payments: Suppose nt consumers arrive at time t. The
payment function p∗t (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t ) ∈ R
nt is defined
below for i = 1, . . . , nt:
p∗it (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t )
=
ß
θ¯
i,j
t if consumer i gets a good
0 otherwise
, (31)
where θ¯
i,j
t is defined as
θ¯
i,j
t := sup
{
x ∈ [θmin, θmax] :∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (h
−i,R
t , (x, j), y
1:k
t ) = 0 , wt(x, j) ≥ 0
}
. (32)
Under Assumptions 1-2, (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ) is an expected-revenue
maximizing, BIC and IR mechanism.
Proof. See Appendix G.
Remark 2. The vectors u∗1:kt and v
∗1:k
t that characterize the
optimal allocation matrix q∗t (·) in Theorem 1 as well as the
quantities θ¯
i,j
t defined in (32) can be found through discretiz-
ing the set [θmin, θmax] with sufficient numerical precision and
applying the methods developed for solving Markov decision
processes with discrete state-action spaces, such as policy
iteration, value iteration and linear programming [17].
A. Example
Consider a simple setup with T = 2 and k = 2, where
the consumer arrival process λt(·) follows a Bernoulli dis-
tribution, that is, at each time step a consumer may enter
the market with probability p. For a consumer entering the
market at time t = 1, 2, its flexibility level is equally
likely to be 1 or 2, i.e., gt(j) =
1
2 for j ∈ {1, 2} and,
conditioned on its flexibility level being j, its valuation has
truncated exponential distribution over the interval [0, 1], i.e.,
pit(x|j) =
αj exp(−αjx)
1−exp(−αj)
, x ∈ [0, 1], where α2 > α1 > 0. It
is straightforward to verify that pit(·|j) satisfies Assumption
2. The virtual valuation function (see (14)) associated with
pit(·|j) is of the following form:
wt(x, j) = x−
1
αj
(
1− exp(αj(x− 1))
)
, t = 1, 2.
Suppose the supply profile at time t = 1 is (y11 , y
2
1) = (1, 1)
and no more goods of either variety becomes available at
time t = 2. Suppose a consumer with type (θ˜, 2) arrives
at time t = 1. Under the optimal mechanism characterized
in Theorem 1, this consumer gets a good of variety 2 if
w1(θ˜, 2) > E[V2(H
R
2 , (1, 1)) − V2(H
R
2 , (1, 0))] =: ρ
2
1 (see
(30)). It is straightforward to verify that in this example
E[V2(H
R
2 , (1, 1))] = E[V2(H
R
2 , (1, 0))]
=
p
2
(
Eθ|b=1
[
max{w2(θ, 1), 0}
]
+ Eθ|b=2
[
max{w2(θ, 2), 0}
])
,
from which it follows that ρ21 = 0.
9If instead a consumer with type (θ˜, 1) arrives at time t = 1,
it gets a good of variety 1 if w1(θ˜, 1) > E[V2(H
R
2 , (1, 1)) −
V2(H
R
2 , (0, 1))] =: ρ
1
1. We observe that in this example
E[V2(H
R
2 , (0, 1))] =
p
2
Eθ|b=2
[
max{w2(θ, 2), 0}
]
and thus,
ρ11 =
p
2
Eθ|b=1
[
max{w2(θ, 1), 0}
]
=
p
2
θres1,2
exp(−α1θres1,2)− exp(−α1)
1− exp(−α1)
, (33)
where θresj,t is as defined below
θresj,t := max
{
x ∈ [0, 1] : wt(x, j) = 0
}
. (34)
For instance if α1 = 2 and p = 0.5 we obtain θ
res
1,2 ≈ 0.36 and
thus ρ11 ≈ 0.037.
In general, for the setup described above, it is easy to
check that ρ11 ≥ ρ
2
1, which implies that a consumer with
flexibility level 1 needs to have higher valuation to get an
allocation at t = 1. If the consumer with type (θ˜, j) at time
t = 1 gets a good, it pays θ¯j1 = w
−1
1 (ρ
j
1; j) (see (32)), where
w−11 (·; j) denotes inverse of w1(·, j). Notice that Assumption
2 combined with ρ11 ≥ ρ
2
1 implies that θ¯
1
1 ≥ θ¯
2
1, i.e., a
consumer with flexibility level 1 is charged a higher price
upon allocation of a desired good. For instance, consider
α2 = 3, α1 = 2 and p = 0.5. For this numerical setup
we obtain θ¯11 = w
−1
1 (ρ
1
1; 1) ≈ w
−1
1 (0.037; 1) ≈ 0.39 and
θ¯21 = w
−1
1 (ρ
2
1; 2) = w
−1
1 (0; 2) ≈ 0.29.
At time t = 2 which is the terminal time step, if a consumer
with type (θ˜, j) arrives and a desired good is available, it gets
an allocation if w2(θ˜, j) > 0 and is charged the reserve price
θresj,t at t = 2 as defined in (34). Notice that from Assumption
2 it follows that θres1,2 > θ
res
2,2, meaning that at time t = 2 also,
a consumer with flexibility level 1 needs to have a higher
valuation to get an allocation and is charged a higher price
upon allocation of a desired good. For instance for the case
α2 = 3, α1 = 2 and p = 0.5 we see that θ
res
1,2 ≈ 0.36 > θ
res
2,2 ≈
0.29.
Therefore we observe that in the above setup under the
optimal mechanism, at each time the payment charged to the
more flexible consumers is less than the payment charged to
the less flexible consumers. Moreover, it is straightforward
to verify that θ¯
j
t is non-increasing in t, that is, the payment
charged to the consumers with flexibility level j decreases over
time across all j (e.g., for the case α1 = 2, p = 0.5 we see that
θ¯11 ≈ 0.39 > θ¯
1
2 = θ
res
1,2 ≈ 0.36). Intuitively, this is expected
because unlike t = 1, the consumer that arrives at t = 2, faces
no competition from future consumers. On the other hand, the
virtual valuation of a consumer that arrives at t = 1 must
outweigh the expected revenue that can be produced by saving
the good for a consumer that may arrive at t = 2. As a result,
a consumer that arrives at t = 2 is expected to be charged less
(only the reserve price associated with its flexibility level) than
a consumer of the same flexibility level that arrives at t = 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of designing a dynamic expected-
revenue maximizing, BIC and IR mechanism for allocation
of multiple goods of k varieties to flexible consumers over T
time steps. In our model, a random number of goods of each
variety may become available to the seller at each time and a
random number of consumers may enter the market at each
time. We considered impatient consumers that need to get one
good of one of their desired varieties within the single time
step of their arrival. Each consumer has a flexibility level,
i.e., a number between 1 and k that indicates the varieties of
the goods the consumer finds equally desirable. A consumer’s
flexibility level as well as the utility it enjoys upon allocation
of a desired good are its private information. We character-
ized the allocation and payment functions under the optimal
mechanism in terms of the solution to a dynamic program.
We leveraged the structure of the consumers’ flexibility model
to simplify the dynamic program and provided an alternative
description of the optimal mechanism in terms of thresholds
computed by the dynamic program.
An interesting extension to the present work would be to
study this setup with patient consumers, i.e., consumers may
be present for more than one time step. In addition, studying
the dynamic mechanism design problem under the settings
where both arrival and departure times of each consumer are
privately known to them is an important direction for further
exploration. In the present setup we studied the case where
each consumer wants to receive a single good of its desired
varieties. Another interesting scenario would be the case where
the consumers may need to get multiple goods of their desired
varieties.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Consider a BIC and IR mechanism (q1:T , p1:T ). The ex-
pected revenue under this mechanism is
E
{ T∑
t=1
Nt∑
i=1
pit(Ht)
}
=
T∑
t=1
n¯∑
nt=1
λt(nt)
nt∑
i=1
E
[
pit(Ht) | Nt = nt
]
. (35)
The conditional expectation in (35) can be written as
k∑
b˜i
t
=1
θmax∫
θmin
EH−it
[ pit(H
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)) |Nt = nt ] ft(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t) dθ˜
i
t
=
k∑
b˜it=1
θmax∫
θmin
P it (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t, nt) ft(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t) dθ˜
i
t (36)
where P it (·) is the interim payment defined in (11). Because
of Lemma 2, we know that
P it (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t, nt) ≤ θ˜
i
t Q
i
t(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t, nt)−
θ˜it∫
θmin
Qit(α, b˜
i
t, nt) dα. (37)
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Using (37) and after simplifying the integrals, (36) can be
upper bounded by the following expression
k∑
b˜i
t
=1
θmax∫
θmin
Qit(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t, nt) wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)ft(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t) dθ˜
i
t, (38)
The upper bound in (38) implies that the expected total revenue
in (35) can be upper bounded by the following
T∑
t=1
n¯∑
nt=1
λt(nt)
nt∑
i=1
k∑
b˜i
t
=1
θmax∫
θmin
E
[
wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
∑
j≤b˜i
t
q
i,j
t (H
−i
t , (θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)) | Nt = nt
]
ft(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t) dθ˜
i
t ,
=
T∑
t=1
n¯∑
nt=1
λt(nt)
nt∑
i=1
E
[
wt(θ
i
t, b
i
t)
∑
j≤bi
t
q
i,j
t (Ht) | Nt = nt
]
=
T∑
t=1
E
[ Nt∑
i=1
wt(θ
i
t, b
i
t)
∑
j≤bi
t
q
i,j
t (Ht)
]
= E
[ T∑
t=1
Nt∑
i=1
wt(θ
i
t, b
i
t)
∑
j≤bi
t
q
i,j
t (Ht)
]
≤ max
q1:T
E
[ T∑
t=1
Nt∑
i=1
wt(θ
i
t, b
i
t)
(∑
j≤bi
t
q
i,j
t (Ht)
) ]
.
Thus, the expected revenue of any BIC and IR mechanism is
upper bounded by the maximum value in (15). Consequently,
a BIC and IR mechanism (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ) for which q
∗
1:T achieves
the maximum value in (15) and p∗1:T are of the form given in
(16),4 guarantees the largest expected revenue among all BIC
and IR mechanisms. This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We prove this by induction.
Base case: Clearly the expression given for RT (hT ) in (17)-
(18) solely depends on hRT and y
1:k
T (recall that RT+1(·) =
0). That is, the information in hT \ {hRT , y
1:k
T } is irrelevant
for determining RT (hT ). Therefore, if we define the function
VT (·) as:
• If hRT = ∅ : VT (h
R
T , y
1:k
T ) := 0.
• If hRT 6= ∅ :
VT (h
R
T , y
1:k
T ) := max
A∈S(hR
T
,y1:k
T
)
{ |hRT |∑
i=1
wT (θ˜
i
T , b˜
i
T )
k∑
j=1
A(i, j)
}
,
the equality in (19) holds true at time T .
Induction hypothesis: Suppose there exists some function
Vt+1(·) such that (19) holds true at time t+ 1.
Now, we want to show that there exists some function Vt(·)
such that (19) holds true at time t. In other words, we want
to show that given the history ht = {hRt , y
1:k
t , x
1:k
t , ht−1},
4p∗
1:T
form in (16) make the upper bound on the expected total revenue
attainable, by ensuring that the inequality in (37) becomes an equality for
(q∗
1:T
, p∗
1:T
).
the expression given for Rt(·) in (17)-(18) is fully determined
from {hRt , y
1:k
t } and does not depend on ht \ {h
R
t , y
1:k
t } =
{x1:kt , ht−1}. For the case h
R
t = ∅, from (17) we see that
Rt(ht) is expressed as:
Rt(ht) = E
[
Rt+1(ht, H
R
t+1, {y
j
t +X
j
t+1}
k
j=1, X
1:k
t+1)
]
.
Using the induction hypothesis, the above expression can be
written as:
Rt(ht) = E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {y
j
t +X
j
t+1}
k
j=1)
]
.
Since HRt+1 and X
j
t+1 are independent of ht, the expected
value above depends only on y1:kt . Thus, when h
R
t = ∅, we
can define
Vt(∅, y
1:k
t ) = Rt(ht) = EHR
t+1
,Y 1:k
t+1
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, Y
1:k
t+1)
]
.
Note that the above definition of Vt(·) satisfies (20).
For the case hRt 6= ∅, we see from (18) that Rt(ht) is
expressed as:
Rt(ht) = max
A∈S(hR
t
,y1:k
t
)
{ |hRt |∑
i=1
wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
k∑
j=1
A(i, j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
†
+ E
[
Rt+1(Ht+1)|ht,At = A
]}
. (39)
Clearly, the term † in the above expression does not depend on
the information in ht \ {hRt , y
1:k
t } = {x
1:k
t , ht−1}. Moreover
the set S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) over whose elements the max{·} operation
above is carried out is fully specified in terms of hRt , y
1:k
t
and does not depend on {x1:kt , ht−1}. It thus remains to show
that the second term in the max{·} operation above, does not
depend on the information in {x1:kt , ht−1} either. Using the
induction hypothesis, let us expand the second term above as
follows:
E
[
Rt+1(Ht+1)|Ht = ht,At = A
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, Y
1:k
t+1)|Ht = ht,At = A
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1,
{yjt −
|hRt |∑
i=1
A(i, j) +Xjt+1}
k
j=1) | {h
R
t , y
1:k
t , x
1:k
t , ht−1},A
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {y
j
t −
|hRt |∑
i=1
A(i, j) +Xjt+1}
k
j=1) | h
R
t , y
1:k
t ,A
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, Y
1:k
t+1) | h
R
t , y
1:k
t ,A
]
, (40)
where we used the fact that HRt+1 and X
1:k
t+1 are independent
of ht. It is clear that the above conditional expectation is a
function of hRt , y
1:k
t ,A and does not depend on the informa-
tion in {x1:kt , ht−1}. The above analysis allows us to conclude
that
(i) Rt(ht) is completely determined by h
R
t , y
1:k
t . Thus, we
can define a function Vt(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) = Rt(ht).
(ii) Further, using (39) and (40) above, it is clear that Vt(·)
satisfies (21).
This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Let A :=
{
u1:k ∈ Zk≥0 :
j∑
l=1
ul ≤
j∑
l=1
ylt , u
j ≤ njt , ∀j
}
,
i.e., A equals the set in the right-hand side of (22). Clearly
when hRt = ∅, U(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) := {01×k} = A.
Let us now consider the information state st = (h
R
t , y
1:k
t )
with hRt 6= ∅. We start with showing that U(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) ⊆ A.
Consider a vector u1:kt ∈ U(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ). Since n
j
t is the number
of consumers with flexibility level j that arrive at time t and
u
j
t is the number of consumers with flexibility level j that get
a good at time t, we clearly have that u
j
t ≤ n
j
t .
Now, consider
∑j
l=1 u
l
t. This is the total number of con-
sumers with flexibility level less than or equal to j that get
a good. Since consumers cannot get a good of variety higher
than their flexibility level, it follows that
∑j
l=1 u
l
t is less than
or equal to the total number of available goods of variety less
than or equal to j. In other words,
∑j
l=1 u
l
t ≤
∑j
l=1 y
l
t. Thus,
u1:kt ∈ A.
We now show that script A ⊆ U(hRt , y
1:k
t ). Consider u
1:k
t ∈
A. In order to prove that u1:kt ∈ U(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ), we need to
show that there exists some matrix D ∈ S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) such
that
|hRt |∑
i=1
i:b˜it=j
∑
l≤j
D(i, l) = ujt , ∀j. Let us construct such a matrix
according to the following allocation procedure:
• Select any u1t consumers with flexibility level 1 and
allocate each of them a good of variety 1. This is a
feasible allocation since u1t ≤ y
1
t .
• Select any u2t consumers with flexibility level 2 and
allocate each of them either an unallocated good of
variety 1 (if u1t < y
1
t ) or a good of variety 2. These
can be done since u1t + u
2
t ≤ y
1
t + y
2
t .
• Proceed in a similar fashion for all flexibility levels: select
any u
j
t consumers with flexibility level j and allocate each
of them a good of any of the varieties 1, . . . , j depending
on their availability. Since
j∑
l=1
ult ≤
j∑
l=1
ylt the described
allocation is feasible.
• The other consumers that arrived at time t but were
not selected for allocation in the above steps get zero
allocation.
It is straightforward to verify that allocation matrix D con-
structed above belongs to S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) and that it serves u
j
t
consumers of flexibility level j. Hence, every vector u1:kt ∈ A
corresponds to a feasible allocation matrix D ∈ S(hRt , y
1:k
t ).
Hence u1:kt ∈ U(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ). This establishes A ⊆ U(h
R
t , y
1:k
t )
and completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
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Define
F(hRt , y
1:k
t ) :=
{
(u1:k, v1:k) ∈ Z2k≥0 :
u1:k ∈ U(hRt , y
1:k
t ) , v
1:k ∈ V(u1:k, y1:kt )
}
,
(41)
Further, for any (u1:k, v1:k) in F(hRt , y
1:k
t ) define
SF (h
R
t , y
1:k
t , u
1:k, v1:k) :=
{
A ∈ S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) :
|hRt |∑
i=1
A(i, j) = vj ,
|hRt |∑
i=1
i:b˜it=j
j∑
l=1
A(i, l) = uj , j = 1, . . . , k
}
.
(42)
It is easy to check that the set of all feasible allocation matrices
can be partitioned as
S(hRt , y
1:k
t ) =
⋃
(u1:k,v1:k)∈F(hR
t
,y1:k
t
)
SF(h
R
t , y
1:k
t , u
1:k, v1:k).
(43)
Therefore, the value function in (21) can be written as
Vt(st) = max
(u1:k,v1:k)∈F(st)
{
max
A∈SF (st,u1:k,v1:k)
{
|hRt |∑
i=1
wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
k∑
j=1
A(i, j) + E
[
Vt+1(St+1)|st,At = A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
†
}}
,
(44)
The † term in (44) can be written as
† = E
[
Vt+1
(
HRt+1, {y
j
t − v
j +Xjt+1}
k
j=1
)]
The above expectation depends only on v1:k and y1:kt and not
on the allocation matrix itself. Thus (44) becomes
Vt(st) =
max
(u1:k,v1:k)∈F(st)
{
E
[
Vt+1
(
HRt+1, {y
j
t − v
j +Xjt+1}
k
j=1
)]
+ max
A∈SF (st,u1:k,v1:k)
{ |hRt |∑
i=1
wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
k∑
j=1
A(i, j)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
‡
}
, (45)
Considering the term ‡ in the above expression, it is straight-
forward to see that for all A ∈ SF (st, u1:k, v1:k),
|hRt |∑
i=1
wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
k∑
j=1
A(i, j) ≤
k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t ,
where w
i,j
t denotes the ith largest element in W
j
t (see (25)).
Further, an allocation matrix that, for each flexibility level j,
gives goods to uj consumers with highest virtual valuations
satisfies the above inequality with equality. Hence,
max
A∈SF (st,u1:k,v1:k)
{ |hRt |∑
i=1
wt(θ˜
i
t, b˜
i
t)
k∑
j=1
A(i, j)
}
=
k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t .
Plugging this result into (45) we obtain
Vt(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) = max
(u1:k,v1:k)∈F(hR
t
,y1:k
t
)
{ k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t
+ E
[
Vt+1
(
HRt+1, {y
j
t − v
j +Xjt+1}
k
j=1
)]}
, (46)
12
which can be rearranged in the form of the nested maximiza-
tions below
Vt(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) = max
u1:k∈U(hRt ,y
1:k
t )
{ k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t
+ max
v1:k∈V(u1:k,y1:k
t
)
{
E
[
Vt+1
(
HRt+1, {y
j
t − v
j +Xjt+1}
k
j=1
)] }}
(47)
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
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We provide an inductive proof of the lemma.
Base Case: At time T , consider a non-empty history hRT and
supply profiles y1:kT and z
1:k
T such that y
i
T = z
i
T + 1 , y
j
T =
z
j
T − 1 and y
l
T = z
l
T for l 6= i, j, where i < j. From
the definition of U(·) in (22) it follows that U(hRT , z
1:k
T ) ⊆
U(hRT , y
1:k
T ). This fact combined with the definition of VT (·)
implies that (27) holds for t = T and hRT 6= ∅. If h
R
T = ∅,
then VT (h
R
T , z
1:k
T ) = 0 = VT (h
R
T , y
1:k
T ). Hence (27) holds true
at time T for all hRT .
Induction hypothesis: Suppose that the statement of the
lemma is true for Vt+1(·). Consider two supply profiles y1:kt
and z1:kt such that y
i
t = z
i
t + 1 , y
j
t = z
j
t − 1 and y
l
t = z
l
t for
l 6= i, j, where i < j. We now show that given such y1:kt and
z1:kt the property in (27) holds true at time t, i.e.,
Vt(h
R
t , y
1:k
t ) ≥ Vt(h
R
t , z
1:k
t ) , ∀h
R
t . (48)
Let us first consider hRt = ∅. In this case, we have
Vt(∅, y
1:k
t ) = E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, Y
1:k
t+1) | y
1:k
t
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {y
l
t +X
l
t+1}
k
l=1)
]
≥ E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {z
l
t +X
l
t+1}
k
l=1)
]
(49)
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, Y
1:k
t+1) | z
1:k
t
]
= Vt(∅, z
1:k
t ),
where the inequality in (49) follows from the induction
hypothesis by noting that for any realization x1:kt+1, y
i
t+1 =
yit + x
i
t+1 = z
i
t+1 + 1 , y
j
t+1 = y
j
t + x
j
t+1 = z
j
t+1 − 1 and
ylt+1 = y
l
t + x
l
t+1 = z
l
t+1 for l 6= i, j. This establishes the
property in (27) for hRt = ∅.
Now consider hRt 6= ∅. To prove (27), it suffices to show that
for every (u1:k, v1:k) ∈ F(hRt , z
1:k
t ), there exists (u
1:k, a1:k) ∈
F(hRt , y
1:k
t ) such that
k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t + E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {y
l
t − a
l +X lt+1}
k
l=1)
]
≥
k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t + E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {z
l
t − v
l +X lt+1}
k
l=1)
]
(50)
Recall that (u1:k, v1:k) ∈ F(hRt , z
1:k
t ) implies that v
l ≤ zlt for
all l.
For (u1:k, v1:k) ∈ F(hRt , z
1:k
t ) two cases arise:
• Case 1: vj < z
j
t .
In this case we define a1:k = v1:k. It is clear that
(u1:k, a1:k) ∈ F(hRt , y
1:k
t ) and (50) holds.
• Case 2: vj = zjt .
In this case we cannot set a1:k = v1:k since vj > yjt .
Therefore, we define a1:k as follows: ai = vi + 1, aj =
vj − 1 and al = vl for l 6= i, j. It is straightforward to
verify that (u1:k, a1:k) ∈ F(hRt , y
1:k
t ). Further, using the
induction hypothesis
E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {y
l
t − a
l +X lt+1}
k
l=1)
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, y
1
t − a
1 +X1t+1, . . . , y
i
t − a
i +X it+1,
. . . , y
j
t − a
j +Xjt+1, . . . , y
k
t − a
k +Xkt+1)
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, y
1
t − v
1 +X1t+1, . . .
. . . , yit − (v
i + 1) +X it+1, . . . , y
j
t − (v
j − 1) +Xjt+1, . . .
. . . , ykt − v
k +Xkt+1)
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, y
1
t − v
1 +X1t+1, . . .
. . . , (yit − 1)− v
i +X it+1, . . . , (y
j
t + 1)− v
j +Xjt+1, . . .
. . . , ykt − v
k +Xkt+1)
]
= E
[
Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {z
l
t − v
l +X lt+1}
k
l=1)
]
.
This proves (50) and thus, establishes (27) for hRt 6= ∅
Therefore, (27) holds true for all hRt at time t. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
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We prove the lemma in the following steps:
Step 1: We first show that v∗1:k ∈ V(u1:k, y1:kt ). Clearly
v∗j ≤ yjt and
∑k
l=j v
∗l ≤
∑k
l=j u
l for all j. To show that
v∗1:k ∈ V(u1:k, y1:kt ), it suffices to show that
∑k
l=1 v
∗l =∑k
l=1 u
l. We will utilize the following claim.
Claim: Suppose that for all m = 1, . . . , j: (i)
∑k
l=m v
∗l <∑k
l=m u
l and, (ii) v∗i = yit, for all i < j. Then, (a) v
∗j = yjt
and, (b)
∑k
l=j+1 v
∗l <
∑k
l=j+1 u
l.
Assume for now that the claim is true. We have already
seen that
∑k
l=1 v
∗l ≤
∑k
l=1 u
l. Suppose
k∑
l=1
v∗l <
k∑
l=1
ul. (51)
Then, using the claim above with j = 1 implies that v∗1 =
y1t and
∑k
l=2 v
∗l <
∑k
l=2 u
l. We can now use the above claim
for j = 2 to conclude that v∗2 = y2t and
∑k
l=3 v
∗l <
∑k
l=3 u
l.
Proceeding this way until j = k−1, we get that (1) v∗m = ymt
for all m ≤ k−1 and (2) v∗k < uk. Further, (2) and definition
of v∗k implies that v∗k = ykt . Thus, the entire v
∗1:k vector is
equal to the y1:kt vector. But we started with the statement
that equation (51) is true. Thus,
∑k
l=1 y
l
t <
∑k
l=1 u
l which
contradicts the fact that u1:k ∈ U(hRt , y
1:k
t ). Thus, equation
(51) is false and hence
k∑
l=1
v∗l =
k∑
l=1
ul.
The only thing left now is the proof of the claim.
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Proof of claim: The inequality
∑k
l=j v
∗l <
∑k
l=j u
l implies
that v∗j <
∑k
l=j u
l −
∑k
l=j+1 v
∗l. This, along with the
definition of v∗j implies that v∗j = yjt . Therefore (a) holds
true.
We already know that
∑k
l=j+1 v
∗l ≤
∑k
l=j+1 u
l. If∑k
l=j+1 v
∗l =
∑k
l=j+1 u
l, then from (i) in the claim
statement with m = 1 it follows that
∑j
l=1 v
∗l <
∑j
l=1 u
l.
This combined with v∗i = yit, for all i < j in (ii) and
v∗j = yjt in part (a) implies that
∑j
l=1 y
l
t <
∑j
l=1 u
l
which contradicts the fact that u1:k ∈ U(hRt , y
1:k
t ). Hence,∑k
l=j+1 v
∗l =
∑k
l=j+1 u
l cannot be true. This establishes
(b).
Step 2: For any v1:k 6= v∗1:k in V(u1:k, y1:kt ) consider
the highest j such that vj 6= v∗j . We argue that vj > v∗j
cannot be true. Given the definition of v∗j , either v∗j = yjt
or v∗j = uj + (
∑k
l=j+1 u
l −
∑k
l=j+1 v
∗l). If v∗j = yjt ,
then vj > v∗j contradicts v1:k ∈ V(u1:k, y1:kt ). Now
suppose v∗j = uj + (
∑k
l=j+1 u
l −
∑k
l=j+1 v
∗l). Given that
vl = v∗l, l = j + 1, . . . , k, vj > v∗j would then imply
that vj > uj + (
∑k
l=j+1 u
l −
∑k
l=j+1 v
l) or arranged
differently
∑k
l=j v
l >
∑k
l=j u
l. This combined with the
fact that
∑k
l=1 v
l =
∑k
l=1 u
l, would then imply that∑j−1
l=1 v
l <
∑j−1
l=1 u
l, which contradicts v1:k ∈ V(u1:k, y1:kt ).
Thus it can only be the case that vj < v∗j .
Step 3: For any v1:k 6= v∗1:k in V(u1:k, y1:kt ), we define a
new vector T (v1:k) as follows: Pick the highest j such that
vj < v∗j .5 Then, pick the highest i < j with vi > 0. It
can easily be shown that such i and j exist. Then, T j(v1:k) =
vj+1, T i(v1:k) = vi−1 and T l(v1:k) = vl for l 6= i, j, where
T l(v1:k) denotes the lth entry in T (v1:k). We now argue that
T (v1:k) ∈ V(u1:k, y1:kt ). For m < i or m ≥ j, it is clear that
m∑
l=1
ul ≤
m∑
l=1
T l(v1:k).
Since j is the highest index with vj 6= v∗j , it follows that
j−1∑
l=1
vl >
j−1∑
l=1
v∗l ≥
j−1∑
l=1
ul.
Now, for any m such that i ≤ m < j,
m∑
l=1
T l(v1:k) = (vi − 1) +
i−1∑
l=1
vl =
( j−1∑
l=1
vl
)
− 1 ≥
m∑
l=1
ul.
Therefore T (v1:k) satisfies all the inequalities∑m
l=1 T
l(v1:k) ≥
∑m
l=1 u
l,m = 1, . . . , k. Further, it is easy
to verify that T j(v1:k) ≤ yjt . Thus, T (v
1:k) ∈ V(u1:k, y1:kt ).
We now show that the objective value in (29) is (weakly)
5Note that the case vj > v∗j got ruled out in Step 2.
larger under T (v1:k) compared to that under v1:k. Let
a1:k := T (v1:k). Using Lemma 8
E[Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {y
l
t − v
l +X lt+1}
k
l=1)]
= E[Vt+1(H
R
t+1, y
1
t − v
1 +X1t+1, . . .
. . . , yit − v
i +X it+1, . . . ,
. . . , y
j
t − v
j +Xjt+1, . . . , y
k
t − v
k +Xkt+1)]
≤ E[Vt+1(H
R
t+1, y
1
t − v
1 +X1t+1, . . .
. . . , yit − (v
i − 1) +X it+1, . . . ,
. . . , y
j
t − (v
j + 1) +Xjt+1, . . . , y
k
t − v
k +Xkt+1)]
= E[Vt+1(H
R
t+1, {y
l
t − a
l +X lt+1}
k
l=1)].
Therefore the objective value in (29) can only improve after
applying the transformation T (·).
Step 4: Starting with any v1:k 6= v∗1:k in V(u1:k, y1:kt ),
we can keep applying transformation T (·) to construct new
vectors in V(u1:k, y1:kt ) that result in an objective value at least
as large as that under v1:k. This is conducted in the following
while-loop:
1: while v1:k 6= v∗1:k do
2: v1:k ←− T (v1:k)
3: end while
4: return v1:k
The above while-loop will terminate in finite number of
steps with v1:k = v∗1:k at termination. Thus, the objective
value under v∗1:k is at least as large as that under any
v1:k ∈ V(u1:k, y1:kt ). Thus, v
∗1:k is optimal.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Suppose nt consumers arrive at time t and let (r, j) denote
the type reported by the ith consumer arriving at time t. As-
suming that all other consumers report their types truthfully, let
Q∗it (r, j, nt) and P
∗i
t (r, j, nt) denote the expected allocation
and payment (see (10)-(11)), respectively, for this consumer
under the mechanism (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ), when it reports the pair
(r, j).
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rational-
ity: Because of Lemma 1, we can establish that (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T )
is Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational by
showing that the following conditions hold true:
(i) Q∗it (r, j, nt) is non-decreasing in r for all i, t.
(ii) Q∗it (r, j, nt) is non-decreasing in j for all i, t.
(iii) P ∗it (θ
min, j, nt) = 0 for all j, nt, t, i.
(iv) θmin Q∗it (θ
min, j, nt) = 0 for all j, nt, t, i.
(v) P ∗it (r, j, nt) is of the form given in (12) for all i, t.
We establish these conditions below:
(i) In order to establish that Q∗it (r, j, ·) is non-decreasing
in r, it suffices to show that
∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t ) is
non-decreasing in r, where h
−i,R
t denotes the set of reports
from all consumers other than i. Given h
−i,R
t , y
1:k
t consider
two information states
¯
st := (h
−i,R
t , (¯
r, j), y1:kt ) and s¯t :=
(h−i,Rt , (r¯, j), y
1:k
t ), where r¯ > ¯
r. That is, consumer i has
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types (
¯
r, j) and (r¯, j) under
¯
st and s¯t, respectively. We now
want to show that∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) ≥
∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (¯
st). (52)
Clearly if
∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) = 1, (52) holds true. Let’s consider
the case where
∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) = 0. We need to argue that in this
case
∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (¯
st) = 0. Let u
∗1:k denote the optimal u1:k vector
obtained from solving the dynamic program in (30) under the
information state s¯t. Since consumer i does not get served
under u∗1:k (recall that
∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) = 0), it can be shown that
u∗1:k is optimal under
¯
st as well and that consumer i will
not get served under the information state
¯
st. In other words,∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (¯
st) = 0 and (52) is true.
(ii) In order to establish that Q∗it (r, j, ·) is non-decreasing in
j, it suffices to prove that
∑
l≤j
q
∗i,l
t (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t ) is non-
decreasing in j. We will use the following proposition in our
proof.
Proposition 1. Let u∗1:k denote the optimal vector that
results from solving the dynamic program in (30) under the
information state st = (h
R
t , y
1:k
t ). Consider two flexibility
levels j and j′ with j < j′. Then, every consumer with
flexibility level j′ and virtual valuation greater than w
u∗j ,j
t
gets served under (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ).
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Proof. Suppose the proposition is not true. Define the vector
uˆ1:k as follows: uˆj = u∗j − 1, uˆj
′
= u∗j
′
+ 1 and uˆl = u∗l
for all l 6= j, j′. Clearly uˆ1:k ∈ U(hRt , y
1:k
t ). Consider the
expression of the value function given in (24) (which is
equivalent to the definition in (30)). It is straightforward to
verify that the first term in (24), i.e.,
k∑
j=1
uj∑
i=1
w
i,j
t would be
strictly larger under the vector uˆ1:k compared to that under
u∗1:k. Moreover, since V(u∗1:k, y1:kt ) ⊆ V(uˆ
1:k, y1:kt ) (see
(23)), the second term in (24) (i.e., the inner maximization over
v1:k vector) cannot decrease under the vector uˆ1:k compared to
that under u∗1:k. Therefore, the objective in (24) (equivalently,
(30)) strictly improves under the vector uˆ1:k compared to that
evaluated at u∗1:k, which contradicts the optimality of u∗1:k.
This completes the proof.
Given h
−i,R
t , y
1:k
t consider two information states ¯
st :=
(h−i,Rt , (r,¯
c), y1:kt ) and s¯t := (h
−i,R
t , (r, c¯), y
1:k
t ), where
c¯,
¯
c ∈ {1, . . . , k}, c¯ >
¯
c. Thus, we need to show that:∑
l≤c¯
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) ≥
∑
l≤
¯
c
q
∗i,l
t (¯
st). (53)
Clearly, if
∑
l≤c¯
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) = 1, (53) holds true. Let’s consider
the case where
∑
l≤c¯
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) = 0. We need to argue that in
this case
∑
l≤
¯
c
q
∗i,l
t (¯
st) = 0. Let u
∗1:k denote the optimal u1:k
6If u∗j = 0, then wu
∗j,j
t :=∞.
vector obtained from solving the dynamic program in (30)
under the information state s¯t. Let n
j
t (st) denote the number of
consumers with flexibility level j that arrive at time t under the
information state st. Because consumer i with flexibility level
c¯ does not get a good under s¯t (recall that
∑
l≤c¯
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) = 0),
it clearly means that u∗c¯ ≤ nc¯t(s¯t) − 1 = n
c¯
t(¯
st). Therefore,
indeed u∗1:k ∈ U(
¯
st) (see (22)). We now want to show that
u∗1:kt is also optimal under ¯
st.
Consider the following sequence of implications:
(a) Since consumer i does not get served under the infor-
mation state s¯t (recall that
∑
l≤c¯
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) = 0), it follows
from Proposition 1 that its virtual valuation must be no
greater than the virtual valuations of the consumers that
are served from flexibility levels lower than c¯; in particular
wt(r, c¯) ≤ w
u∗¯
c,
¯
c
t .
(b) From Assumption 2 we know that wt(r,
¯
c) < wt(r, c¯).
Therefore, (a) implies that wt(r,
¯
c) < w
u∗¯
c,
¯
c
t .
(c)
∑
l≤c¯
q
∗i,l
t (s¯t) = 0 combined with (b) implies that the vector
u∗1:k results in the exact same objective value in (30)
under both information states s¯t and
¯
st.
(d) Since
¯
c < c¯ and wt(r,
¯
c) < wt(r, c¯), it is straightforward to
show that under the information state
¯
st, the value function
in (30) is upper bounded by that under s¯t, i.e., Vt(
¯
st) ≤
Vt(s¯t).
(e) Items (c) and (d) combined, imply that u∗1:k is optimal
under
¯
st as well.
Items (e) and (b) above imply that consumer i with type
(r,
¯
c) does not get served under the information state
¯
st, i.e.,∑
l≤
¯
c
q
∗i,l
t (¯
st) = 0. Thus, (53) is true.
(iii)-(v): To establish conditions (iii)-(v) consider the pay-
ment form given below:
ρ∗it (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t ) = r
∑
j′≤j
q
∗i,j′
t (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t )
−
r∫
θmin
(∑
j′≤j
q
∗i,j′
t (h
−i,R
t , (α, j), y
1:k
t )
)
dα. (54)
We first argue that monotonicity of q∗t (·) as established above
(condition (i)), implies that the payment form in (54) is
equivalent to the one given in (31). Then we show that this
equivalent payment form in (54), indeed satisfies conditions
(iii)-(v).
If consumer i with the report (r, j) does not get a good (i.e.,∑
j′≤j
q
∗i,j′
t (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t ) = 0), then the monotonicity of
q∗t implies that the integral in (54) is also 0. Hence, in this
case consumer i pays nothing. On the other hand, if consumer
i gets a good (i.e.,
∑
j′≤j
q
∗i,j′
t (h
−i,R
t , (r, j), y
1:k
t ) = 1), then the
definition of θ¯
i,j
t (see (32)) implies that the integral in (54) is
(r− θ¯i,jt ). Hence, in this case consumer i pays θ¯
i,j
t . Thus, the
payment in (54) is identical to the payment in (31).
We now argue that the equivalent expression for p∗t (·) in
(54) satisfies the conditions in (iii)-(v).
To see that condition (iii) above holds true, recall that
from Assumption 2 we have that wt(θ
min, j) < 0 for all j, t.
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Hence, it must be that
∑
j′≤j
q
∗i,j′
t (h
−i,R
t , (θ
min, j), y1:kt ) = 0
for all h
−i,R
t , y
1:k
t , j, i, t. Otherwise q
∗
1:T will not maximize
the objective in (15) whose solution is given by the dynamic
program in (20)-(21). Therefore, from (54) it follows that
ρ∗it (h
−i,R
t , (θ
min, j), y1:kt ) = 0 for all h
−i,R
t , y
1:k
t , j, i, t. This
implies that P ∗it (θ
min, j, nt) = 0 for all j, nt, t, i which
establishes condition (iii) above. Based on the same argument
condition (iv) above holds true as well.
By taking the expectation of ρ∗it (H
−i,R
t , (r, j), Y
1:k
t ) in (54)
over (H−i,Rt , Y
1:k
t ), where H
−i,R
t = H
R
t \ {(θ
i
t, b
i
t)}, it is
easily established that the expected payment P ∗it (·) satisfies
(12) with θmin Q∗it (θ
min, j, nt) = 0. Hence condition (v) above
holds true.
The above arguments establish that the mechanism
(q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ) is Bayesian incentive compatible and individually
rational.
Expected-revenue maximization: The allocation functions
q∗1:T constructed in Theorem 1 are the optimal control strategy
for the stochastic control problem in (15). This is because
Lemma 4-9 established that the dynamic program in (30) is
equivalent to the one in (17)-(18), which was formulated to
address the control strategy optimization in (15). Moreover, the
payment functions p∗1:T defined in (31) (which is equivalent to
(54)) satisfy (16). Therefore, based on the results of Lemma 3,
the mechanism (q∗1:T , p
∗
1:T ) is an expected revenue maximizing
BIC and IR mechanism.
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